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COMMENTS 
FunmE INTERESTS-EFFECT OF CHANGE OF CoNDITIONS ON 
RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND PossrnILITIES OF REvERTER CREATED TO CoN-
TROL THE UsE OF LANo--The owner of land who desires to control its 
future use has a wide variety of legal devices available. The most 
familiar are the use of restrictive covenants which give rise i.o equitable 
servitudes, enforceable by injunction, the special limitation which 
provides for an automatic termination of the grantee's estate if he 
deviates from the required use, and the condition subsequent which 
leaves in the grantor a right of re-entry exercisable at his option if the 
grantee breaches the condition by putting the land to a non-conforming 
use. Thus, because he wanted to keep his grazing cattle in sight, the 
owner of a lot now lying within Boston sold it many years ago subject 
to the condition that the height of buildings thereon should not exceed 
thirteen feet. Though the cattle are no longer grazing, the condition 
may still prevent the erection of taller buildings.1 
There are some marked differences in the law with reference to 
restrictive covenants, on the one hand, and conditions and limitations 
on the other. One of the most significant differences rests in their 
potential duration. Whereas courts of equity will refuse enforcement 
of restrictive covenants after conditions have changed so as to make the 
restrictions undesirably burdensome, and law courts may give only 
nominal damages for breach of the covenant, a change of conditions 
which has eliminated the reason which prompted the creation of a 
right of entry or possibility of reverter is supposed to be immaterial.2 
The latter restrictions, in the absence of a statute limiting their duration, 
can be enforced, at least in theory, no matter how long after their crea-
1 LEACH, CAsEs AND MATERIALS oN FUTURE !NTERESTs, 2d ed., 50 (1940). 
2 For the common law background of conditional estates see Walsh, -"Conditional 
Estates and Covenants Running with the land,'' 14 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. REv. 162 (1936); 
Bordwell, ''The Common Law Scheme of Estates," 18 IowA L. REv. 425 (1933). The 
several purposes served by possibilities of reverter and conditions subsequent are illustrated 
in Brake, "Fees Simple Defeasible," 28 KY. L.J. 424 (1940). 
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tion the forbidden event comes to pass.3 When a change of circum-
stances has occurred, then, conditions subsequent and special limita-
tions adversely affect the value of land and render the title less market-
able. 4 They also constitute a hindrance on alienability because, with 
the passage of time, the heirs of the grantor multiply and it becomes 
impossible to trace all of them to obtain a release.5 A second significant 
difference rests in the fact that restrictive covenants are frequently held 
void when the burden is not created for the benefit of other property.6 
In contrast, conditions subsequent and special limitations can be 
created for entirely personal reasons, with the result that owners of 
land are often prevented from utilizing it in ways made appropriate 
by the passage of time and changes in the neighborhood. 7 
In only a few states is there legislation undertaking to curb the 
duration of rights of entry and possibilities of reverter. Even in these 
states, the statutes, far from striking at the root of the evil in appropriate 
situations, lay down only general directives.8 It can be stated that 
3 In the United States, rights of entry and poSSI"bilities of reverter have been held not 
subject to the Rule against Perpetuities. One of the reasons given is that there are always 
persons in esse who can convey the whole fee and therefore the power of alienation, at 
least in theory, is not suspended. But the Rule against Perpetuities strikes down executory 
interests at least even though they do not suspend the power of alienation. See Sn.ms, 
HANDBOOK OF nm LAw OF FUTURB lNrERESTS 375 (1951). Professor Simes suggests 
that the reason is purely historical. On the subject see CLABK, REAL CoVENANTS AND 
OnmR lNTEREsTs WHICH RUN WITH LAND, 2d ed., 197 (1947); 28 Mxca. L. REv. 1015 
(1930); 133 A.L.R. 1476 (1941). 
4Van Vliet and Place, Inc. v. Gaines, 249 N.Y. 106, 162 N.E. 600 (1928). 
5 Restrictive covenants also designed to control the use of land nevertheless come to 
an end when the original purpose cannot be enforced either because of impossibility or 
change of conditions. Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N.E. 691 (1892). They 
can also be removed as a cloud on title. McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 
109 N.E. 162 (1915). 
6 5 PROPERTY RBSTATBMBNT §537(a) (1940); Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 
2 N.E. 946 (1885). 
7 For other objectionable features of these interests in land see Goldstein, ''Rights of 
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land," 54 HARv. L. 
RBv. 248 (1940). Some decisions hold that since the enactment of the Statute Quia 
Emptores, determinable fees cannot be created. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §93 
(1920). The reason is that such fees imply tenure which was abolished by the statute. 
But generally in the United States possibilities of reverter have been recognized. Eminent 
writers have, however, expressed the view that the statute forbids determinable fees. See 
1 SxMBs, THB LAw oF Funnra lNrEREsTs 321 (1936). 
s Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 30, §§37b,d,e,f. This statute makes possibilities of reverter 
inalienable and not devisable, limits their duration to fifty years. Such interests are extin-
guished on the dissolution of a corporation when the corporation reserves them. See com-
ment, 43 ILL. L. RBv. 90 (1948). Mass. Laws Ann. (1933) c. 184, §23, limits the 
restrictions on land to a thirty-year period, but only where a longer period is not specified 
in a deed or will. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.46 forbids frivolous or trivial conditions 
attached to the conveyances. Wis. Stat. (1951) §230.46 is similar to the Michigan statute. 
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §500.20. This statute covers conditions by devise as well as by 
grant and limits the duration to the time they are of substantial benefit to the owners. The 
duration of these interests is also limited to thirty years, but here, regardless of the grantor's 
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until the present time the task of mitigation and adaptation to modem 
exigencies in this field has been left largely to the courts; 
Because the right of entry and the possibility of reverter are legal 
interests in land that can be enforced by a simple ejectrnent action, 
courts of equity have not been able to apply any doctrine of change of 
conditions to prevent enforcement. As a result, the traditional aver-
sion to forfeitures has constantly taxed the courts' ingenuity in coping 
with situations where the divesting of estates would be unconscionable.9 
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the skills which courts 
have developed to avoid inequitable results which might arise from 
forfeiture of estates, and, further, to attempt to demonstrate that judicial 
opinion may be in a transitional stage, tending to incorporate into law 
the equitable doctrine of change of conditions in disposing of cases 
involving rights of entry and possibilities of reverter.10 
I. Constructional Preferences 
This paper will not deal separately with the two interests in land, as 
the courts have generally leaned toward construing a deed as creating 
a condition rather than a limitation and there is a dearth of cases dealing 
chiefly with possibilities of reverter. Apparently the courts have pre-
ferred to meet the challenge of forfeitures at the constructional level, 
finding possibilities of reverter only when they would not entail in-
equitable results.11 An estate on condition subsequent terminates only 
intent to prolong his interest. A six-year statute of limitations is set for assertion of a right 
of re-entry. 
In general as to statutory provisions concerning the duration of these interests in land, 
see CLARX, REAL COVENANTS AND Onmn lNTERESTs WHICH RUN WITH LAND, 2d ed., 
197 et seq. (1947); SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING lNTERESTS IN 
LAND 236 (1953); Goldstein, ''Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to 
Restrict the Use of Land," 54 HARv. L. REv. 248 (1940). 
9 As an example of the strict views taken by the courts in general, it may be stated 
as a proposition needing no citation of authority that the absence of a re-entry clause today 
may by itself be sufficient to avoid the finding of a condition subsequent. Yet in Littleton's 
time express language of condition was given effect as a condition subsequent subject to 
forfeiture whether or not a clause of forfeiture was used. LlTTLBTON, TENURES (Wam-
baugh ed.) §§328-330 (1903). At that time, however, restrictive covenants were unknown. 
10 For examples of capricious conditions imposed in deeds of grant, and for examples 
of estates created in favor of one without any interest deserving protection, see Scott, "Con• 
trol of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 527 (1917). Valid social purposes, 
however, may still be served by these interests in land in some cases. See Brake, "Fee 
Simple Defeasible," 28 KY. L.J. 424 (1940). In England, rights of re-entry are subject to 
the Rule against Perpetuities. Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §4(3) 
(1925). 
11 E.g., in Johnson v. Lane, 199 Ark. 740, 135 S.W. (2d) 853 (1940), the granter 
had donated land worth $20,000 on the condition that $250,000 was to be spent to build 
a schoolhouse on it, the deed to be absolute so long as the land was used for school 
purposes. After three years, there was still no school. The plaintiff was a creditor of the 
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by election of the grantor or his successors,12 and not automatically, as 
in the case of a determinable fee. 
One of the major difficulties encountered by the courts in attempt-
ing to prevent unwarranted forfeitures stems from the fact that if a 
possibility of reverter is declared extinguished, the estate of the grantee 
becomes ipso facto enlarged beyond the grant. Moreover, doctrines of 
waiver and estoppel cannot easily he applied to one who holds a possibil-
ity of reverter, since the fee is supposed to revert back to him automati-
cally on the happening of the contemplated event. Out of this largely 
doctrinal difficulty,13 the courts have developed a disregard for distinc-
tions and shown constructional preferences among the several possible 
interests created or reserved.14 
In Sanford 11. Sims15 the court stated: "Technically, perhaps, there 
is a distinction between a possibility of reverter and a right of re-entry 
for breach of condition subsequent; but the distinction is usually not 
observed and the possibility of reverter and right of re-entry for condi-
tion broken are treated as the same."16 The court then found a condi-
tion subsequent but it concluded that it was ineffective after the 
running of the statute of limitations.17 In Priddy 11. School District18 
the hahendum clause read: " ... as long as used for a school house 
site. If it is ever abandoned as a school house site, said land shall revert 
to .... "19 The-possibility of a determinable fee was not even discussed, 
and a condition subsequent was found instead.20 
. grantor. No changes in circumstances appeared. A determinable fee was found. In Stewart 
v. Blain, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 159 S.W. 928, deed shall be "void and inoperative" in 
the event of removal of the schoolhouse. Held to create a determinable fee. The court, 
again, rejected fine distinctions and was content to point out that the parties must have 
meant to create a possibility of reverter. 
12 As between a fee on condition subsequent and a condition precedent, the courts 
favor the former, as it permits the early vesting of estates. De Conick v. De Conick, 154 
Mich. 187, 117 N.W. 570 (1908); Gordon v. Whittle, 206 Ga. 339, 57 S.E. (2d) 169 
(1950). 
13 Dunham, "Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Iden-
tical Twins?" 20 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 215 (1953). 
14See 15 L.R.A. 231 (1908); 47 A.L.R. 1174 (1927). 
1rs 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E. (2d) 495 (1951). 
16 Id. at 648. 
17 For further material on the disregard of the distinction between possibilities of 
reverter and conditions subsequent, see 33 AM. Jtm., Life Estates, Remainders, and Rever-
sions §§205, 208 (1941); 16 A.L.R. (2d) 1246 (1951). 
1s 92 Okla. 254, 219 P. 141 (1923). 
19 Id. at 265. 
20The same was held in Bay City Land Co. v. Craig, 72 Ore. 31, 143 P. 911 (1914), 
where the deed contained language of reverter and provided that grantor shall become 
owner "as fully and absolutely as if this deed had not been made." In Stewart v. Blain, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 159 S.W. 928, the distinction between possibilities of reverter and 
conditions subsequent was called "largely fanciful." 
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In Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Ennis-Calvert Compress Co.,21 the 
grantee had built a cotton compress on the land and maintained it from 
1877 to 1892. Suit was brought in 1900. The deed contained the 
following language: " ... on the happening of any one of said several 
contingencies . . .. title and possession of the tract herein conveyed 
shall . . . by force thereof, and without the necessity of a reconveyance, 
ipso facto revert to and vest in said [grantor] its successors and 
assigns. . . ."22 The court found that only a condition subsequent 
was created and saved the remote grantee's title despite a breach of 
condition by holding a corporation as not the successor to the right of 
grantor corporation. In Wagner v. Wallowa County23 one of the 
reasons why the court refused to find that clear words of reverter 
created a determinable fee was that if the title was to revert back, the 
whole fee passed to the grantee. This reason would make reverter 
clauses inadequate to create special limitations in all cases.24 
The constructional preference for conditions as opposed to limita-
tions, on the surface, does not show anything more than dislike of 
forfeitures because the condition subsequent is less drastic. One may 
argue that it does not alleviate the change of conditions problem because 
forfeiture is still possible. But a close scrutiny of the cases will show 
that the constructional preference for conditions is often only the first 
step in the process of clearing title in meritorious cases. A further 
finding of expiration of the condition for performance, or waiver, or 
mere substantial delay in pursuing the remedy of re-entry often follows. 
This second step is effective in forever freeing land of conditions and 
will be taken in cases where a change of circumstances has made the 
second :finding equitable. Illustrations of this proposition can be found 
in a study of the facts of the cases cited in this section as well as in 
cases cited in section IV of this comment. Very often the delay neces-
sary to induce the court to declare a condition extinct is not even the 
period required for the statute of limitations to run. In these cases 
the courts do not say "laches" only because a court in a legal action 
of ejectment is not supposed to apply equitable doctrines. The fourth 
21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) 56 S.W. 367, error refused. 
22 Id. at 368. Emphasis added. 
23 76 Ore. 453, 148 P. 1140 (1915). 
24Bemard v. Bowen, 214 N.C. 121, 198 S.E. 584 (1938). See also Williams v. Box 
Church Baptist Church, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 75 S.W. (2d) 134 ("so long as said 
premises are used as agreed herein" and reverter clause; held, a condition subsequent. One 
strong dissent). Priddy v. School District, 92 Okla. 254, 219 P. 141 (1923); Jones v. 
McLain, (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) 41 S.W. 714; Dyer v. Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11 N.E. 
(2d) 451 (1937). 
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section of this comment will again touch on thi~ point with citation 
of authorities. 
II. Total Disregard of Distinctions between Restrictions on Land 
So far, only one case has bluntly rejected all kinds of distinctions 
and held that a change in the neighborhood would deprive the owner 
of a power of termination of the right to enforce a forfeiture of the 
grantee's estate. In Letteau v. Ellis25 the defendant breached the condi-
tion by allowing Negro occupancy of the premises. The neighbor-
hood had become largely inhabited by Negro families since the time 
of conveyance. In denying the forfeiture of defendant's estate, the 
court declared: 
'We find it needless to follow appellant's arguments on the 
technical rules and distinctions made between conditions, cove-
nants, and mere restrictions .... A principle of broad public policy 
has intervened to the extent that modem progress is deemed to 
necessitate a sacrifice of many former claimed individual rights. 
The only obstacle met has been . . . the disinclination to disturb 
vested property rights. To some extent this, too, has yielded in the 
sense that many rights formerly labeled as property rights by a 
process of academic relation are now considered merely personal 
and have been subjected to the common good."26 
This case has met with the approval of learned writers,27 but unfortu-
nately it is ignored by the courts of jurisdictions other than California. 
This disregard of distinctions between legal future interests and the 
equitable servitude represents a true incorporation of the equitable 
doctrine of change of conditions into law. Authority for it is still scant 
and that is the reason why it is more nearly accurate to say that the 
courts are now in a stage of transition rather than having accepted the 
equitable doctrine of change of conditions. 
25 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932), hearing den. by California Supreme 
Court, June 13, 1932. Accord, Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 291, 39 P. (2d) 
249 (1934), hearing den. by California Supreme Court, Feb. 18, 1935. 
20 Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584 at 588-589, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932). The 
court found support in a dictum found in Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573 at 587, 205 
S.W. 217 (1918): ''If the court ••• had found ••• that the conditions had so changed 
since the conveyance was made ••• that an enforcement of the restriction no longer could 
serve the original purpose, then it would have been improper to allow the forfeiture." 
27Walsh, "Conditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land," 14 N.Y. 
UNIV. L.Q. REv. 162 at 191 (1937); Ferrier, "Determinable Fees and Fees upon Condi-
tion Subsequent in California,'' 24 CALIP. L. REv. 512 at 516 (1933); Goldstein, "Rights 
of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of ~d,'' 54 HAB.v. 
L. REv. 248 at 268 (1940). 
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III. The Courts' Main Weapon: Constructional Devices to Avoid 
Conditions and Limitations 
One need cite no authorities for the proposition that the courts 
look upon forfeitures with disfavor and will consequently construe 
strictly all clauses pointing to the creation of rights of re-entry and 
possibilities of reverter. Literally any of the cases cited in this paper 
can be found to contain a reference to this judicial attitude. Thus a 
mere recital of purposes, even to the exclusion of all other uses, is 
generally inadequate to create such interests. The courts' strictness 
has in some instances reached astounding proportions. It is difficult 
to ascribe some results to anything but change of circumstances and 
passage of time concurring to make the recognition of future interests 
most inequitable. 
In Storke v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co.28 a deed 
dated 1889 conveying property, then outside Chicago, included anti-
saloon restrictions and the following language: " ... in case of breach 
in these covenants or any of them said premises shall immediately 
revert to the grantors, and the said party of the second part shall forfeit 
all right, title and interest in and to said premises."29 By 1945, sixteen 
more saloons were operating in the neighborhood and a saloon had 
been kept on the premises for eleven years. The tract is now a business 
section in Chicago. The defendant insurance company, lessor of the 
saloon keeper, had paid $42,500 for the premises. In trying to deny 
the plaintiff's argument that a determinable fee had been created, the 
defendant himself was at such a loss that he argued that a condition 
subsequent was created instead and that it had been waived. The 
court relieved the defendant in an ingenious fashion: since the plain-
tiffs sued for a partition as successors of the grantor, they must show 
title in themselves to succeed. There was no language of limitation 
in the deed, therefore a determinable fee was not created, and the 
plaintiffs did not yet have title. At this point the courts normally £.nd 
a condition subsequent as the alternative to a possibility of reverter 
barely missed. Such a conclusion would, however, have left the 
defendant still open to possible attacks on his title. But the court 
went on to point out that if a condition subsequent was created, the 
plaintiffs must make re-entry to get title. However, plaintiffs were 
precluded since there was no re-entry clause in the deed. The court 
seemed to be saying that the defendant had a fee simple on condition 
2s 390 ill. 619, 61 N.E. (2d) 552 (1945). 
29 Id. at 621. 
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subsequent, but that no one had a right of re-entry for condition broken. 
It is perhaps significant that the court points out that if the clause had 
created a restrictive covenant, it would be unenforceable now because 
of change of circumstances in the subdivision, which by this time had 
become valuable business property. 
In In re Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church30 the deed 
conveyed a lot in 1871 "so long as said lot is held and used for church 
purposes." The court found in 1929 that an absolute fee was trans-
ferred. It was the opinion of the court that since the limiting words 
appeared only in the habendum, they could not reduce the grant. A 
strong dissent pointed out that determinable fees have often been 
recognized though the limiting words appeared only in the habendurn. 
The majority distinguished an earlier conveyance solely because of 
lack of the words "and no longer" at the end of the clause introduced 
by "so long as."31 It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the 
court felt it would be unfair to let a remote successor or heir get a 
church building with all the additions after a long time following the 
grant. 
When rights of re-entry and possibilities of reverter are created to 
prescribe or forbid certain uses of land, the similarity they bear to real 
covenants has offered the court the most widely wielded weapon of 
defense in the struggle against the draftsman. It has been stated that 
"a clause in a deed will be construed as a covenant, unless apt words of 
condition are used, and even then it will not be held to create a condi-
tion, unless it is apparent from the whole instrument and the circum-
stances that a strict condition was intended."32 In St. Peter's Church v. 
Bragaw33 the deed contained clear language of condition and reverter 
in case of breach. The court said, "There is no interest which is not 
adequately protected by regarding the clause as intended to create a 
80 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N.E. 218 (1929). Cf. Schurch v. Hanaman, 47 Ohio App. 
383, 191 N.E. 907 (1933). 
81 In Chouteau v. St. Louis, 331 Mo. 781, 55 S.W. (2d) 299 (1932), words of con-
dition were held unavailing. More than a century after the conveyance, the heirs of the 
grantor sued to recover the land since it was no longer used as a site for a courthouse. The 
court held that since words of condition introduced a new clause, they expressed a limita-
tion of the estate granted, and since no forfeiture clause or re-entry clause was inserted, 
no right of re-entry was created. The court at the same time declared that the grantee's 
having lived up to the condition for more than a century was perhaps nothing less than 
what the grantor anticipated. See also Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 133 A. 565 (1926), 
47 A.L.R. ll72 (1927) (use as a cemetery discontinued after 100 years. No condition 
or limitation because of lack of words of forfeiture. The court points out that the plaintiffs 
had no equity). Lynch v. Melton, 150 N.C. *595, 64 S.E. 497 (1909). 
32 Hinton v. Vinson, 180 N.C. 393 at 396, 104 S.E. 897 at 899 (1920). Emphasis 
added. 
33 144 N.C. 89, 56 S.E. 688 (1907). 
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covenant or limitation in trust that the property shall not be used for 
the one certain purpose mentioned."34 ' Land was conveyed in Gordon 
v. Whittle35 " ••• upon the express condition that the second party 
shall lay out and set aside and dedicate . . . [land] for a park and 
recreation center, and to be forever maintained as such -for the benefit 
of the residential and philanthropic enterprises of the second party on 
said St. Simon's Island."36 The condition remained unperformed for 
more than 22 years, when a grantee sued to clear title. The court took 
three steps to accomplish that end in view of grantors' long acquies-
cence. First, as no one can dedicate land without owning it, the 
condition, if any, must have been subsequent. Secondly, lack of words 
of defeasance or forfeiture rule out a condition subsequent, and a 
covenant must be found instead. Thirdly, the grantor himself could 
not enforce the covenant because it is declared to be for the benefit of 
the grantee. In short, the words quoted were mere surplusage. It is 
hard to believe that if the suit had been brought shortly after the con-
veyance, when conditions had not yet changed so much, the court 
would have reached the same result in the face of a dear breach. 
A forfeiture in W. F. White Land Co. v. Christenson31 would have 
injured the holder of a mortgage on the lot, the holder of a mechanic's 
lien, and the remote grantee himself. It does not seem improbable that 
the change of condition, even in this respect, carried some weight with 
the court. The building of a house worth less than $5,000 and 
closer to the curb than specified were conceded to be breaches. The 
deed read, "In case the said grantee ... shall ... violate any one of said 
conditions . . . the said land and all improvements . . . shall im-
mediately revert to and become the property of the grantor . . . and 
it shall be lawful for said grantor . . . to re-enter said premises as in its 
first and former estate."38 Another clause gave the grantor as well as 
neighboring landowners the right to enforce the conditions whether 
breached or about to be breached. Clearly one provision was intended 
to reserve to the grantor a "gambler's chance of recovering the property," 
and the other was in the nature of a restrictive covenant. Despite the 
strong language pointing to a possibility of reverter, the court concluded 
that the latter clause and the circumstances pointed to a covenant to 
benefit adjoining land. The court seemed aware of its startling inter-
34 Id. at 94. The word "abandonment" was construed not to include a sale of the 
land. 
85 206 Ga. 339, 57 S.E. (2d) 169 (1950). 
86 Id. at 339. 
s1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 14 S.W. (2d) 369. 
8s Id. at 370. Emphasis added. 
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pretation when it said: "In view of the right so given [to enJOlil 
breaches], the grantor is in no position to claim the harsher remedy of 
forfeiture of title."39 Obviously the court imposed an election of 
remedies on the grantor.40 
The expressed or unexpressed intent to benefit adjoining property 
may of itself spell defeat for the draftsman, and be seized upon by the 
courts to find a covenant despite strong language of condition, for-
feiture, and re-entry. Land was conveyed in Post 11. W eil41 in 1807 
upon the special condition that no part of the land or buildings should 
ever be occupied as a tavern. Since it appeared that the original plan 
was to benefit adjoining property, only a covenant running with the 
land was found to exist 80 years after the conveyance. The court 
rather openly declared that, "Although the words of the clause . . . are 
apt to describe a condition subsequent, . . . we are in no wise obliged 
to take them literally."42 The case makes specific reference to change 
of circumstances and the injustice that would follow if a condition were 
recognized. 
In Scaling 11. Sutton43 the deed recited that "In order to secure the 
erection of private residential buildings of a good grade . . . and to 
carry out a general plan for the . . . benefit . . . of each . . . purchaser 
of lots . . . this deed is made upon the following express conditions, 
the violation of any one of which by the grantee . . . shall give the 
right to said Clover Land Co. to reenter upon said premises . . . and 
terminate all of the rights of grantee. . . ."44 The court held that a 
covenant enforceable by adjoining owners was created. An amusing 
feature of this case is that, in order to escape the force of a covenant, 
the grantee himself argued that a condition subsequent had been 
created, but even he argued to no avail. The deed in Carruthers 11. 
Spaulding45 also recited that the conditions were for the benefit of the 
entire tract and that on failure to observe them the land would revert 
to the grantor. The court avoided a forfeiture by declaring that the 
39 Id. at 372. 
40 That the granter may elect: Munro v. Syracuse L. & N. R. Co., 200 N.Y. 224, 93 
N.E. 516 (1910). It may not be without signilicance, as reflecting a lack of faith in the 
force of the forfeiture clause, that in the White Land Co. case the granter, while electing 
to forfeit the grantee's estate, added also a prayer for an injunction as an alternative relief. 
For other examples of utilization of the technique of finding a covenant to avoid conditions 
and limitations, see Carolina & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465, 81 S.E. 682 
(1914); Hawkins v. Third, 244 Ala. 534, 14 S. (2d) 513 (1943). 
41115 N.Y. 361, 22 N.E. 145 (1889). 
42 Post v. Weil, 115 N.Y. 361 at 369, 22 N.E. 145 (1889). 
43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 167 S.W. (2d) 275. 
44 Id. at 277. 
45 242 App. Div. 412, 275 N.Y.S. 37 (1934). 
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recital of benefit to the tract was consistent only with construction 
of the language as of an equitable restriction resulting from a 
covenant. 46 
Trusts or equitable charges are also resorted to by the courts as 
alternatives to conditions or limitations on the fee, in the process of 
construction of language indicating possibilities of reverter or rights of 
re-entry. Despite the use of clear words of condition in MacKenzie v. 
Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City,47 the court announced that words 
seemingly appropriate to a condition may operate to create other rights 
and that" ... the absence of words of determination or reverter being 
noted, the intent of the parties . . . will be best subserved by holding 
the clause to be a declaration of trust."48 Although the courts are astute 
in finding equitable charges on land conveyed or devised rather than 
conditions or limitations, such cases, while reflecting the same judicial 
abhorrence for forfeiture of estates, do not generally spring from a 
desire to control the use of land but rather to insure the payment of a 
money or other obligation.49 
When there has been a sufficient change of circumstances, a court 
may refuse to recognize a condition subsequent because the original 
plan of the vendor was not included by him in subsequent sales of land. 
In Brown v. Wrightman60 a 45-acre tract was conveyed in 1886 " 'upon 
the following expressed condition subsequent, to-wit: ... [there fol-
low restrictions against selling liquor and maintaining bawdy houses] 
• . . and in case of the happening of either of said events then this 
grant to cease and be void.' "61 The grantor later sold lots of another 
tract without including in the deed the condition subsequent. The 
court pointed out that by the time the defendant acquired his lots the 
46 On similar language another New York court had found a clear condition subsequent 
in Schulman v. Ellenville Electric Co., 152 Misc. 843, 273 N.Y.S. 530 (1934). In this 
case, however, no danger of forfeiture was present, as the owner of the right of re-entry 
had released his interest. 
47 67 N.J. Eq. 652, 61 A. 1027, 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 227 (1905). 
48 Id. at 661. For other examples of the utilization of the trust device, see President 
and Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central Power Corp. of Vermont, 101 Vt. 325, 143 
A. 384 (1928) ("it is a condition of this devise," etc.); Delaware Land & Development Co. 
v. First & Central Presbyterian Church of Wilmington, 16 Del. Ch. 410, 147 A. 165 
(1929) (land to be used for certain purposes, "and to no other use, intent or purpose 
whatsoever"). 
49 Daly v. Wilke, 111 ill. 382 (1884) ("subject, however, to the terms and conditions 
herein limited" held a charge). The same in Parsons v. Millar, 189 Ill. 107, 59 N.E. 616 
(1901) ("provided that"); Spangler v. Newman, 239 ill. 606, 88 N.E. 202 (1909) ("on 
the condition that he pay to"); Canal Bank v. Hudson, Ill U.S. 66, 4 S.Ct. 303 (1884) 
("under penalty, in case of non compliance, of loss of the above property"). 
60 5 Cal. App. 391, 90 P. 467 (1907). 
111 Id. at 392. 
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neighborhood had ceased to be a respectable residential neighborhood 
and had become a place devoted to lewd resort and retail of liquor, and 
ruled that the defendant's clear breach of condition could no longer 
entitle grantor to a recovery of the property. The court explained the 
result by displaying a wholesome (in this case) confusion of contract 
law with property law. Since the plaintiff (grantor) had himself con-
tributed to the change of the neighborhood in other lots, he had waived 
the condition as to the original 45 acres and estopped himself. 
Counsel's argument that the grantor's conduct with respect to other 
land could have no effect on his property rights in the first tract con-
veyed was met by the court with a quotation from a Kentucky case52 
denying a right to enforce a covenant to one who had contributed to 
rendering performance of the contract unreasonable. The court treated 
the grantor's right as a restrictive covenant although the validity of the 
condition subsequent in its inception was not doubted in the least.53 
IV. The Courts' Last Resort: Finding No Breach, Temporary 
Breach, Expiration, Waiver 
The strictness of the courts does not confine itself to the construc-
tional question of whether conditions or limitations have been created. 
Where rights of re-entry or possibilities of reverter must be recognized 
because of unequivocal language, the courts will proceed undaunted 
to amazingly strict constructions of what events, if any, will cause a 
forfeiture, and they will also take judicial notice of changes of condi-
tions for the purpose of limiting the scope of the condition and finding 
that it has exhausted its force. A recent case is particularly illustra-
tive of the techniques of the courts, since the majority opinion had to 
make use of a number of them. For the consideration of $1, land was 
conveyed to a city in J. M. Carey & Brother v. City of Casper,54 
" ... upon the express condition that a City Hall building ... 
is to be erected . . . and that said Block is to be used thereafter 
for the maintenance thereon of such City Hall . . . and also for 
the maintenance of a Public Park and for no other purposes . . . 
in case said . . . property is disposed of for any other purposes . . 
then . . . title to said . . . property shall revert to [grantor] . 
its successors or assigns."55 
52 Duncan v. Central Pass. R. Co., 85 Ky. 525 at 535, 4 S.W. 228 (1887). 
53 The same doctrine was applied in Hanna v. Rodeo-Vallejo Ferry Co., 89 Cal. App. 
462, 265 P. 287 (1928), and Wilshire Oil Co. v. Star Petroleum Co., 93 Cal. App. 437, 
269 P. 722 (1928). 
54 66 Wyo. 437, 213 P. (2d) 263 (1950). 
55 Id. at 448. 
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The city performed for twenty years. Then, contemplating erecting 
a county building jointly with the county, the city induced the grantor 
to change the conditions in order to permit the joint undertaking. New 
conditions were drawn which read in part: 
"Provided that said real property . . . shall be used for the 
maintenance thereon of a City Hall Building . . . or for the con-
struction and maintenance thereon of a City-County building . . . 
or for public park purposes, and for no other purpose whatsoever 
... in the event said property, or any part thereof, is disposed of or 
used for any other purpose than those herein provided, title to said 
property shall revert to [grantor, successors, and assigns] .... "56 
The plan for a county building on the block was abandoned and a new 
building erected one-half mile away. The city then moved its offices 
to the new building and rented most of the old City Hall to businesses 
and even to one United States agency, although the conditions speci-
fied that they were intended to exclude especially state or federal uses 
of the premises. The court needed so much subtlety in this case that 
the opinion ran to 35 pages. The possibility of a determinable fee was 
not even considered, as that would have made it impossible to free the 
land of all burdens. A condition subsequent could not be avq_ided. 
The court conceded that the second set of conditions had been violated, 
since they forbade any use of any part of the premises for other pur-
poses. Therefore these conditions had to be made inoperative. They 
were held to be "executory," i.e., contingent on the actual erection of a 
county building by the city and county jointly, and thus brushed aside 
unceremoniously since the contingency never arose. This was a 
remarkable achievement on the part of the court, because the new agree-
ment contained no hint of being contingent on anything; it was an 
executed substitution of one set of conditions for another. This tech-
nique opens new vistas. Any conditions might be found impliedly 
contingent on some event at any time and be held to live only until a 
sufficient change of circumstances makes them unreasonable. But the 
court seemed hardly convinced of the soundness of its own exploit, as it 
hastened to caution that in case of error on this score the violations 
would be held to be only transitory and not sufficient to work a for-
feiture anyway. This explanation falls a little short of rationality too, 
since the violations had been carried on for seven years and the city was 
making a business use of the premises for all practical purposes. As 
for the first set of conditions, the court decided that "to dispose of" 
li6 Id. at 450. 
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meant here only "to alienate." Even if leasing could be considered a 
sort of alienation, the city had leased only most of the building, not all. 
Besides, it was impossible for the court to define "City Hall purposes," 
and apparently so long as anything connected with the municipality 
was being done in any corner of the building, there was a use for City 
Hall purposes. But the court did not stop here, since so far the condi-
tions would still be in force, even if in a much weaker form, and could 
still endanger the city's title in the future. The court took notice of 
the substantial growth of the city which had doubled its population 
since the time of the conveyance and decided that even a condition 
so hard to breach would be an unwarranted burden on the city. Thus 
it proceeded to free the defendant city of any worry for the future. The 
court held that a condition not specifying a period of time for its 
duration, or a perpetuity, did not call for operation in perpetuity, but 
was complied with by performance over a long term of years. The 
reason was that conditions are presumed to be made on the theory that 
they are subject to the exigencies of the grantee's development. In 
this case the city had substantially complied long enough.57 This 
seems to import the doctrine of change of circumstances squarely into 
the legal structure of these interests, but only for the cases where there 
is no express recital that a condition is to last in perpetuity. While this 
may be very effective in practice since express recitals of perpetuity 
are not common in existing conditions, still draftsmen could avoid 
this pitfall in the future by merely inserting the needed recital. It thus 
becomes apparent that the incorporation of the equitable doctrine of 
change of conditions into this case was the result of a conscious process 
of judicial innovation tailored to fit only one situation, albeit a common 
one. 
Where even a covenant might prove unreasonable because of the 
passage of time and the change in circumstances, a court may even 
57 For other cases in which courts have refused to find a breach though conceding 
the validity of the condition subsequent, see Mills and Wife v. Evansville Seminary and 
Others, 58 Wis. 135, 15 N.W. 133 (1883) (grantees sold the land to a shoe manufacturing 
business; when granter threatened action, they had land reconveyed to themselves, hastily 
repaired the premises and began to use it as a seminary anew for a few pupils by the time 
granter sued). Carpenter v. Graber, 66 Tex. 465, 1 S.W. 178 (1886) (language of special 
limitation restricting land to street purposes; held, obstruction by building erected by third 
party, no forfeiture unless grantee delayed unreasonably in preventing forbidden use). 
Dagget v. Fort Worth, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 177 S.W. 222 (grantor must prove aban-
donment besides non-user). Gleghorn v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 62 S.W. 1096 
("solely for the purpose of a gin, and to be solely and only used for a gin site; and in the 
event said real estate is not used for such purposes, then • • • said property is to revert to 
me"; held, even though parts of the tract are used for other purposes, no forfeiture so long 
as a gin was operated on the premises; reason: no forfeiture provision specifically for addi-
tional uses). Skipper v. Davis, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 59 S.W. (2d) 454. 
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strive to construe a clause as creating a condition subsequent and then 
strike it down by finding it extinguished because of lapse of time. A 
deed conveyed land to a railroad in 1878 strictly for railroad purposes 
and included words of reverter in case of breach.58 The clause, how-
ever, recited that the grantee covenanted and agreed to perform. In 
1926 the grantee moved to another depot and kept only a track on a 
small strip of the land. Then it built a filling station on the property 
and leased it. In 1938 it conveyed the land outright to the plaintiff, 
who kept an auto repair shop and a gasoline station on the land and 
sued in 1949 to clear title. The presence of a covenant for railroad 
purposes might prove very burdensome, since the land was now in the 
hands of a non-railroad enterprise. The court found a condition sub-
sequent despite words of covenant, and held that it had been breached 
in 1926, and that grantor's successors were now barred by a fifteen-
year statute of limitations. The court resorted in this case to a kind of 
reverse doctrine of "substantial compliance," as it held that the main-
tenance of a roadbed on a small strip was not sufficient to prevent a 
breach in 1926 (substantial breach doctrine?). On the basis of the 
City of Casper case,59 could anyone doubt that if lack of a breach had 
been necessary to prevent an inequitable result the same facts would 
have been held to constitute substantial compliance? The hopeless-
ness of the grantor's successor's case is further brought out later in the 
opinion. Counsel argued that a breach occurred in 1938 only when 
the land was conveyed to plaintiff, since until then the land was held 
under the same deed of conveyance and the railroad had only leased 
the premises, no adverse possession being shown. Thus in 1949 the 
statute of limitations would still be running. The court's answer is a 
masterpiece of inconsistency, but it served to relieve a party from an 
unconscionable forfeiture more than 70 years after the conveyance. It 
stated that if there was no breach in I 926, there was still no breach in 
1950, since a railroad line was still crossing a small segment of the land, 
and consequently the land was still being used for railroad purposes. 
Nothing but change of conditions would seem to induce the court to 
strain its analysis to this extent. 
In one case the court refused to enforce a forfeiture purely and 
simply on the ground of laches although the plaintiff had brought an 
ejectment action, and the statute of limitations had not run. The 
validity of the condition was not questioned. The plaintiff did nothing 
5s Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E. (2d) 495 (1951). 
59 See note 55 supra. 
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to estop himself. Improvements had been built on the land. As the 
grantor had notice of the violation since its inception, the fact that he 
waited eleven years to sue caused the court to reject his claim, saying, 
"This is peculiarly a case for the application of equitable principles."60 
What else but the change of conditions brought about by the improve-
ments made the case peculiarly one for the application of equitable 
principles? 
Often if the consideration for the condition is found to have been 
appreciation of remaining land of the grantor, the condition will be 
held inoperative as soon as the purpose can no longer be carried out. 
Such contingency may arise either from a change in the location or 
from sale of adjoining property by the grantor, who thereby loses any 
real interest in the condition. In these cases the distinction between 
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry is even more baldly dis-
regarded. 61 
Another technique used by the courts to prevent forfeitures even 
if a condition subsequent is found is to curtail its operation to a reason-
able time only. The condition expressed in Board of Commissioners 
of Oklahoma County 11. Russel62 specified that the land was to be used 
as a courthouse site, that trees and ornaments should be planted and 
cared for by annual special appropriations. A reverter clause was 
inserted. The condition was performed from 1910 to 1938, when the 
uses and appropriations were discontinued. The court seized upon the 
fact that the clause did not specify any length of time for the duration 
of the condition, took judicial notice of the fact that everyone knows 
that cities develop in time and that the old accommodations become in-
adequate. There was then full compliance in this case, since the condi-
tion was to last only a reasonable time.63 As a matter of fact, sufficient 
changes had occurred to make further performance of the condition 
absurd or nearly so. 
Other factors of varied nature and compelling significance may be 
seized upon by the courts to relieve a party. Thus, when the grantee 
of a fee on condition subsequent is later precluded by law from using 
60 Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Early, 162 Pa. 338 at 340, 29 A. 736 (1894). 
61 Stevens v. Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. Co., (Tex. Comm. App. 1919) 212 S.W. 639; 
Maddox v. Adair, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 66 S.W. 811; Dagget v. City of Fort Worth, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 177 S.W. 222. As to relevance of the consideration as indicative 
of intent when nominal or valuable, see 116 A.L.R. 76 (1938). 
62 (10th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 778, cert. den. 338 U.S. 820, 70 S.Ct. 64 (1949). 
63 The same doctrine was applied in Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Barbour, 89 Ind. 
375 (1883); Sheller v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 108 Wash. 348, 184 P. 344 (1919); 
Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Binnie, 59 Ark. 66, 26 S.W. 528 (1894). See also 7 
A.L.R. 817 (1920). 
262 Mrcmc.AN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
the land for the purposes designated, a forfeiture is excused, 64 and the 
conditions may be held enforceable only so long as one owns property 
in the tract supposed to benefit from them.65 
As indirectly illustrated in some of the preceding cases, a court may 
utilize a concept of the law of contracts and hold that substantial com-
pliance with the condition was shown despite other forbidden users or 
discontinuance.66 In Central Land Company v. City of Grand Rapids61 
the grantor himself, suing in ejectment only two years after the con-
veyance, was denied a forfeiture. The land was conveyed "upon the 
express condition that ... land ... shall be used solely for park, high-
way, street, and boulevard purposes; and if any part thereof be not used 
for any of such purposes, or at any time cease to be used for such 
purposes, or at any time be used for any other purpose, said part or 
parts shall immediately revert to the grantor .... "68 Oil was discovered 
on the land and the city authorized drilling operations by an oil com-
pany. The court ignored the specific restrictions and held that the 
drilling really did not cause a substantial part of the park to be inter-
fered with in the uses for which it was conveyed. The case is remark-
able because the grantor had more than a legitimate interest in seeking 
a forfeiture, since it owned adjoining land, and oil taken from under 
the park would diminish his supply. 
The conduct of a granter before and after the breach of a condition 
is carefully scrutinized by the courts in the search for waivers of per-
formance of the condition. A short wait before suit may, in and of 
itself, bar the grantor.69 Mere silence of the grantor, even without 
acts in reliance by the grantee, may constitute a waiver.70 The "waiver" 
64 United States v. 2086 Acres of Land More or Less, situate in Spartansburg County, 
S.C., (D.C. S.C. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 411. 
65 Second Church of Christ, Scientist, of Akron v. Le Prevost, 67 Ohio App. 101, 35 
N.E. (2d) 1015 (1941). 
66 Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934) (maintenance of 
a courthouse for 35 years held substantial compliance freeing the fee of any burden); 
McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 (1851) (for schoolhouse, religious use and burying 
ground only, plus reverter clause. Renting to a tenant held only a temporary diversion). 
See also 137 A.L.R. 639 (1942). 
67 302 Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485 (1942). 
as Id. at 107. Emphasis added. 
69 Tough v. Netsch, 83 N.H. 374, 142 A. 702 (1928) (slightly more than one year 
wait). 
70 First Christian Church of Vera v. Spinks, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 260 S.W. 1073, 
reversed on other grounds (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 815 (church not built in 24 
months, contrary to condition, grantee conveying nine years later to third party). Gleghorn 
v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 62 S.W. 1096 (court declares that if it should be mis• 
taken in finding no breach, a waiver of performance shown anyway since the plaintiff 
stood by while the defendant was erecting a residence on the premises). 
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cases as a whole indicate a general approach of the courts to the problem 
more in keeping with contract principles than property law. 
When the grantor or assigns may be adequately protected by com-
pensation or damages, a court may refuse forfeiture for breach of a con-
dition subsequent on that ground. 71 
The courts will be strict in deciding who is bound by a condition. 
If a condition applies expressly to a grantee or lessee and no mention 
is made of heirs, executors, or assigns, the condition subsequent may 
become breach-proof after the death of the grantee or lessee, 72 or even 
earlier where the assignee of the grantee breaches the condition when 
assigns are not mentioned in the forfeiture clause.73 
Of course, if a condition violates public policy, it will be entirely 
disregarded.74 On this score it is surprising to note that in view of the 
policy reflected in the rule against perpetuities and against restraints 
on alienation, the courts do not draw freely on the analogy and rest their 
decisions squarely on the ground that conditions and limitations may, in 
time, become violative of public policy. 
Finally, plain ignorance of a breach may constitute a good defense 
against forfeiture.75 In Bonniwell 11. Madison76 the court conceded 
that the condition subsequent had been breached by a failure to keep 
up a fence. However, the grantee's tenant had failed to inform him. 
The court held that to warrant a forfeiture a breach must be willful 
and show an intent not to comply with the condition. 
IV. Conclusion 
It seems reasonable to conclude from the foregoing review of au-
thorities that a draftsman wanting to frame conditions or limitations 
strong enough to withstand the assault of time and changes in the 
circumstances of the location of the land would be confronted with 
an overwhelmingly difficult task. Respectable authority can be found 
for the most varied and unpredictable propositions. It would also seem 
71 Benyman v. Schumacker, 67 Tex. 312, 3 S.W. 46 (1887); Robinson v. Ingram, 
126 N.C. 197 at 200, 35 S.E. 612 (1900) (court would not aid in divesting an estate for 
a breach "when a just compensation can be made in money • • • but will relieve against 
forfeitures claimed by strict construction of any common law rule"). 
72 Henderson v. Beaton, (Tex. Comm. App. 1874) 1 Posey 17. 
1a Ragland v. Overton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 44 S.W. (2d) 768. 
74 83 Umv. PA. L. REv. 670 (1935); 47 HARv. L. REv. 887 (1934). 
75 Rose v. Hawley, 118 N.Y. 502, 23 N.E. 904 (1890) (encroachment of adjoining 
building by 16 inches on land restricted to use for public monuments only; held, grantees 
not guilty of permitting a breach as they could not tell certainly whether there was a 
breach or not). 
76 107 Iowa 85, 77 N.W. 530 (1898). 
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that at the present time unconscionable forfeitures of estates are pos-
sible or probable mainly in legal theory and only when and if a court 
is totally lacking in resourcefulness. Despite the assurance one may 
derive from a consciousness that the courts are ready to exert themselves 
to the fullest to favor a principle of justice over obsolete legal interests, 
it seems unjust that to the courts should be left perennially what is an 
unpleasant task at best. Appropriate legislation would go far in remedy-
ing the situation, at least as to future creations of rights of re-entry and 
possibilities of reverter. There may be a constitutional doubt, however, 
as to the validity of legislation depriving one of interests which are 
already in esse and valid despite change of circumstances or passage of 
time. 
It may be thought that the very assiduousness of the courts in re-
lieving threatened landowners has largely contributed to legislative 
inertia in this area of the law. One may even argue that the courts 
offer sufficient protection with the techniques at their disposal. But it 
seems hardly controvertible that, since attorneys are in no position to 
advise clients in positive terms in the present state of authority, owners 
may have been and may continue to be deterred from a useful and 
reasonable utilization of their land. 
The traditional reluctance on the part of legislatures to bring about 
changes in property law for fear of upsetting titles has no reason to 
assert itself in this field. Any legislation would serve the very purpose 
of freeing land titles of potential or existing threats that may be brought 
to bear at an unreasonable time and under unreasonable circumstances. 
Rinaldo L. Bianchi, S.Ed. 
